ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2026:24309

1. The examination in court

The examination was held at the court sessions of 15 August 2024, 23 October 2024, 7 January 2025, 26 March 2025, 5 June 2025, 27 August 2025, 12 November 2025 and 2 February 2026 (all pro forma), 27 March 2026 and 2 May 2026 (substantive hearing).

2. The indictment

3. Jurisdiction of the district court and the right of the public prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings

- deliberately setting fire and/or causing an explosion, while there is a general risk of danger to property and/or danger of grievous bodily harm and/or danger to life for another person and/or this offence results in someone's death, (to be) committed with terrorist intent (as referred to in Article 157 in conjunction with in Article 176a of the Dutch Penal Code) and/or

- manslaughter (to be) committed with terrorist intent (as referred to in Article 288a of the Dutch Penal Code) and/or

- murder (to be) committed with terrorist intent (as referred to in Article 289 in conjunction with Article 83 of the Dutch Penal Code)

- seeking to induce another person to commit such a serious offence, either personally, or jointly with another or others, or to assist in its commission or to provide the opportunity, means or information for its commission, and/or

- seeking to provide herself or others the opportunity, means and/or information for the commission of the serious offence, and/or

- possessing one or more objects of which she, the accused, knew that they were intended for the commission of the serious offence, by,

The position of the public prosecutor

The Public Prosecutor has taken the position that the court has jurisdiction with regard to the offences charged.

The position of the defence

The defence has taken the position that the right to prosecute the accused with regard to the charge set out under 4 has now lapsed pursuant to Article 255 of the Dutch Penal Code (hereinafter: Sr), as the maximum penalty that may be imposed for an offence under this section is a term of imprisonment of two years.

The opinion of the court

Pursuant to Article 15 of the International Crimes Act (hereinafter: ICA), The District Court of The Hague has jurisdiction to hear the offence charged under count 1. The court further finds that Dutch criminal law applies to all the offences charged and that there is therefore jurisdiction.

The court is of the opinion that the public prosecutor is admissible in the prosecution with regard to the charge set out under 4. The accused is charged with having placed her minor son [minor 1] in a helpless condition and leaving him there, as a result of which he died, pursuant to Article 255 in conjunction with Article 257 Sr. In brief, Article 255 Sr makes it a criminal offence to place or leave in a helpless condition a person whom one is obliged to maintain or care for. Article 257 Sr provides that if the offence described in Article 255 results in death, a prison sentence of up to nine years may be imposed. This section concerns an aggravated offence. Pursuant to Article 70(1)(4) Sr, where the maximum penalty is nine years’ imprisonment, the limitation period is twenty years. This period has not yet expired. The public prosecutor is therefore entitled to bring proceedings.

4. The assessment of the charges

The position of the public prosecutor

The public prosecutor took the position that the offences charged in under counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 can be legally and convincingly proved.

The position of the defence

The defence pleaded acquittal of the charges under count 1, 2 and 3 due to lack of legal and convincing evidence. With regard to the charge set out under 4, the defence has argued for an acquittal on all counts, with the exception of the charge of putting [minor 1] in a helpless condition. With regard to the charge under 5, the defence has argued that an acquittal should be granted for keeping [minor 1] and [minor 2] withdrawn from custody.

To the extent necessary, the court will address the defence's arguments below.

Evidentiary considerations

Finding of the facts

The court annexed the legal means of evidence with the facts and circumstances on which it is based for the judicial finding of facts. On the basis of those legal means of evidence, the court finds the following facts.

Islamic State

The organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) declared the caliphate in the territories it conquered in Iraq and Syria on 29 June 2014. From then on, it stopped using the name ISIL and replaced it with Islamic State (IS). IS is described as a jihadi Salafist organisation, which called for the violent overthrow of secular regimes. Residents of IS-controlled territory, under threat of extreme violence, were required to conform to IS's interpretation of Islam.

At the time the caliphate was declared, IS was headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who presented himself as caliph. Muslims were urged to take the oath of allegiance to the caliph. From its inception, IS was characterized by the systematic use of extreme violence, including publicly carried out executions through beheadings and crucifixions, among others. Terrorist attacks were also carried out inside and outside the caliphate. IS and its followers distributed videos of executions of opponents via the internet and social media. IS has been declared a terrorist organisation by the Dutch courts on several occasions.1

IS and the conscription and enlistment of child soldiers The file contains a knowledge document which describes and documents IS’s practice of conscripting and enlisting child soldiers.

During the period when IS controlled large parts of Syria and Iraq, it conscripted and enlisted child soldiers. From September 2013 onwards, there have been reports of the recruitment of children in Syria, whether forced or not. Videos and other publications produced by IS media organisations show that IS set up training camps for minors in various locations across Syria and Iraq. In these training camps, children underwent religious training, after which they moved on to a military training camp. In some cases, religious training and military training were combined. The military training included, amongst other things, training in combat sports and weapons training. IS documentation and videos have shown that IS publicly disclosed that it was organising training camps for minors.

In 2014, reports of the recruitment and deployment of children in hostilities by IS in Syria and Iraq increased. In the region around the city of Raqqa in northern Syria, there were several training camps for child soldiers. Children as young as ten were recruited there.

Although IS claimed not to deploy children under the age of fifteen in the offensive jihad, this was not the case in practice. As soon as children took part in military training camps, they were enrolled as recruits within IS. This recruitment was formalised by the taking of an oath of allegiance after they had completed the training camps. Thereafter, minors were actually deployed by IS in military units, the police or the organisation’s administrative units. IS records show that children were paid a salary from the moment they were formally conscripted within the group. Children were also usually issued with a weapon following their formal conscription.

By recruiting children and deploying them in hostilities, IS increased the proportion of the population taking part in the fighting, including in the longer term. Minor boys, the cubs of the Caliphate, were seen as the fighters of the future.

Preparation for and departure to Syria by the accused with her children [minor 1] and

[minor 2]

During 2012, the accused immersed herself in the Islamic faith and, in doing so, came across the website Ansaar.nl, an Islamic forum. On this forum, she was in contact with a group called Sharia4Belgium. She had discussions with her sister [sister 1] (hereinafter: [sister 1]) about the situation in Syria and the rise of IS. She believed that what IS was doing there was a very good thing, that IS was the Islamic state, and that this was how one should live. When [sister 1] pointed out that burning people is not permitted under Islam, the accused said: “Yes, but those kuffar this and that.” At the time, the accused was also aware that corporal punishment was imposed under Sharia law.

The accused created a Facebook account around May 2014. Through this account, she came into contact with [name 1] (hereinafter: [name 1]), a man from Denmark who had travelled to Syria in February 2013. In July 2014, he had joined IS as a fighter and was incorporated into a unit called Katiba 57 in the town of Al Bab, a town in Syria near the border with Turkey.

Posts about IS and jihad were published on [name 1]’s Facebook account, including:

- on 22 July 2014, the post, translated into Dutch: “Mashallah, a woman who is far better than the so-called men sitting around; women are the ones in jihad” accompanied by a photograph of an armed woman in a niqab who is likely wearing a bomb belt;

– on 26 July 2014, an image of Al-Baghdadi, the leader of IS, accompanied by the text “O Believing Prince, I sacrifice myself for you.” ; and

- on 26 July 2014, a photograph of [name 1] kneeling beside a severed head and pointing at it with his right index finger. At that moment, [name 1] is wearing black clothing with a belt or strap across the chest bearing the text “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”. The photograph was taken at the Square of Heaven in Raqqa.

On 23 July 2014, a Dutch-language comment was posted in response to the post of 22 July 2014 by “[name 4]” (hereinafter: [name 4]), namely: “Maa Sha Allaah, she is an example to us… and men are sitting at home; wallahi, the men really ought to be ashamed of themselves!!” Six days later, on 29 July 2014, [name 4]’s account stated that she was married to [name 1], a statement which also appeared on [name 1]’s account.

The court assumes, as will be explained in more detail below, that it was the accused who, under the name [name 4], made contact with [name 1] and indicated on her Facebook account that she was married to him.

In the months following her initial contact with [name 1] via Facebook, the accused prepared herself to travel to be with him. In August 2014, she arranged for new passports for herself and her two minor children, [minor 1] and [minor 2] (hereinafter referred to as: [minor 1] and [minor 2] ). In September 2014, the accused asked the father of her children, named [the father] (hereinafter: [the father]), for permission to travel abroad with [minor 1] and [minor 2]. The accused shared parental custody for [minor 1] and [minor 2] with him. The accused had previously been married to [the father] and got divorced in 2003. The accused received permission from [the father] to travel abroad with the children in October 2014. During the same period, she booked airline tickets for herself and the children to Istanbul in Turkey. She had told her family members and her children that she was going to Turkey to meet her new husband there.

In October 2014, the accused cleared out her home and sold her belongings, and on 20 October 2014, the accused flew with her children from Schiphol Airport to Istanbul, Turkey. She withdrew money at Schiphol Airport and in Istanbul and Ankara. Once in Turkey, following instructions given by telephone by [name 1], the accused travelled with the children by bus to the border region between eastern Turkey and Syria. There, in early November 2014, they crossed the border on foot. Once in Syria, the accused met [name 1] and they were married according to Islamic law almost immediately.

In the Netherlands, it became apparent that the children were no longer attending school and that the accused's home in the Netherlands had been cleared out and left with rent arrears. In early November, [sister 1] received a message from [minor 1] stating that the accused was in Syria with her children. On 12 November 2014, [the father] reported the removal of [minor 1] and [minor 2] from parental custody.

Further course of the stay in IS territory:

The accused lived in the town of Al Bab with her two children and [name 1] as from early November 2014. A young woman named [name 5] (hereinafter: [name 5]) lived in their home for a number of weeks during that time. This witness took a photograph of herself with [minor 2] in the house in Al Bab, with an IS flag on the wall in the background. [name 5] stated that the accused found her too modern and too Western, which was deemed undesirable for [minor 2].

Until June 2015, the accused shared a household with [name 1], who was then a member of Katiba 57. [Name 1] kept a firearm at home. At the same time, [minor 2], then aged fifteen, married [name 2] (hereinafter referred to as: [name 2]), a man who was also a member of IS and who moved in with the accused and her family at that time.

In the second half of 2015, [name 1] pronounced the divorce and moved somewhere else. The accused gave birth to a son in December 2015. Around that time, she moved with her children and [name 2] from Al Bab to Raqqa.

[Minor 1], the accused's son, who was fourteen years old at the time, ended up in an IS camp around October 2015, where he stayed for some time. The accused herself has stated that [minor 1] returned home at some point after a period of between one month and six weeks. It has not become clear how exactly [minor 1] ended up in the IS camp. The accused and her daughter [minor 2] have different explanations about this. IS records show that [minor 1] attended two camps: a so-called Sharia camp and a so-called Askari camp; the court understands these to be camps for religious and military training. It is also recorded that [minor 1] was assigned to the military police in Raqqa from mid-January 2016, that he was in possession of a firearm, and that he received a monthly income with which he supported one adult and one child. The accused stated in this regard that [minor 1] cooked meals and carried out cleaning duties at a nearby police unit. [Minor 1] turned fifteen on [date of birth 2] 2016. A note from the accused was found in the IS records obtained, in which she asked the governor of Raqqa on 21 September 2016 for financial support, as the previous support from her son’s katiba had stopped. The IS records also revealed that [minor 1] was transferred to a security and combat unit around April 2017, after which he died on 10 June 2017 during air strikes north of Raqqa.

After [name 2] had left the family in the beginning of 2016, [minor 2] remarried three months later with [name 3] (hereinafter: [name 3]), also an IS fighter. [Name 3] died on 22 September 2017 during an air raid. In October 2017, [minor 2] gave birth to a baby girl.

In December 2017, the accused, [minor 2] and their two children fled from Raqqa to Baghouz. They eventually ended up in the Kurdish-controlled Al Hol refugee camp at the end of 2018. Two years later, the family was transferred to Al Roj. On 7 May 2024, the accused returned to the Netherlands from Al Roj with her daughter and their children, where she was arrested and taken into pre-trial detention.

Reliability of statement of [sister 1] and the IS records obtained

The defence has contested the reliability of [sister 1]’s statement and the IS records obtained.

[Sister 1] had been in contact with the police on various occasions since November 2014 and was interviewed by the police as a witness on 8 April 2025. She has been open and honest from her very first contact with the police. The court is of the opinion that [sister 1] has given a specific, detailed and consistent statement on the relevant points. Furthermore, her statement is sufficiently supported by other findings in the case file, such as the findings of the local police officer and the statements made by the accused's mother and another sister. The court therefore considers [sister 1]’s statement to be reliable and thus admissible as evidence.

The court has no reason to doubt the accuracy and reliability of the NMEC documents insofar as it has relied on them as evidence. It does, however, treat this evidence with due caution. A number of details contained in these NMEC documents – such as the use of various kunyas (nicknames) for [minor 1], the accused herself and her daughter, and the fact that [minor 1] attended camps, worked for the military police, received payments, thereby supporting two family members and was reassigned, are also evident, amongst other things, from the statements of the accused herself, the statements of her daughter and from other documents, such as the letter from the accused in which she asks the governor of Raqqa for an allowance.

Facebook account “[name 4]”

As considered above, the court assumes that the Facebook account “ [name 4] ” belongs to the accused. The defence has contested this. The case file reveals the following in this regard.

The accused has stated that she had created a Facebook account and that she was in contact with [name 1] via this account. [Sister 1] has stated that the accused used the username “[name 4]” on the website Ansaar.nl. It is also noteworthy that the account “ [name 4] ” replied in Dutch to [name 1]’s account and stated that she had married [name 1] on 29 July 2014. In view of this, and taking all factors into mutual consideration, the court finds that the accused was the user of the Facebook account “ [name 4] ”.

In respect of count 2: participation in a terrorist organization

Under count 2, the accused is charged with participating in a terrorist organisation. The relevant legal framework against which this offence should be assessed can be summarised as follows.

Terrorist organisation

Article 140a, paragraph 1, Sr refers to participation in an organisation which has as its purpose the commission of serious offences. The purpose of the organisation, an alliance in varying composition or not, must therefore be aimed at the commission of (specific) terrorist offences listed in Article 83 Sr, provided they are committed with the terrorist intent described in Article 83a Sr.

Pursuant to Article 83a Sr, terrorist intent means the intention of causing serious fear in the population or a part of the population of a country, or unlawfully compelling a public authority or international organisation to act or to refrain from certain acts or to tolerate certain acts, or of seriously disrupting or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

For the proof of the intent, significance may include crimes already committed within the framework of the organisation, the more permanent or structured nature of the cooperation as may be apparent from the mutual division of work or mutual coordination of activities of participants within the organisation with a view to achieving the organisation's common goal and, more generally, the methodical or systematic nature of the activities of participants within the organisation carried out with a view to this goal.

The offence under Article 140a Sr is therefore not about the actual commission of terrorist offences, but about the intention to commit those offences. Even if the organisation’s immediate objective is to commit terrorist offences, the intent referred to in Artice 140(a) Sr is still present. It is not required that the commission of terrorist offences is the organisation's main raison d'être.

Participation It is only possible to speak of participation in a terrorist organisation if the accused forms part of the alliance and has a share in actions aimed at or directly related to the realisation of the intent to commit terrorist offences, or if the accused supports the aforementioned actions. Such a share may consist of the (co-)commission of any crime, but also of the performance of acts of assistance which are not punishable in themselves, but are aimed at realising the intention of the terrorist organisation.

The principle of criminal liability based on conduct requires that there must be a concrete, substantial and (sufficiently) direct link between the participant’s actions and the realisation of the intended objective. The actions must be of such significance that they actually make the realisation of the intended offences more realistic or bring it closer to fruition. This means that the court must adequately substantiate that the alleged conduct (examples of which include: actively propagating jihadist ideology, inciting others to travel (also) to the conflict zone in Syria, and the possession of (a) firearm(s)), whether considered in isolation or in conjunction with one another and in the broader context, satisfies that criterion, according to the advocate general at the Supreme Court.2

The court will take these guiding considerations into account when interpreting the concept of participation.

Intent It is sufficient that the accused generally knows, in the sense of unconditional intent, that the organisation has the commission of terrorist offences as its purpose. It is not required that the accused has any kind of intention to commit the concrete offences intended by the terrorist organisation. Nor is it required that the accused herself participated or participates in the commission of offences committed or to be committed by (members of) the organisation.

IS

It is now consistent case law that during the period of the indictment, IS intended to destroy the fundamental political structure of Syria and Iraq and to instil serious fear in the population, and that participation in the armed struggle on the part of IS entails committing terrorist offences.3 During the period of the indictment, IS achieved its objectives, which included disrupting, destroying and replacing existing political structures by a structure based on an extreme and violent interpretation of Sharia law, partly by sowing death and destruction amongst anyone who did not share their extreme fundamentalist beliefs. The imposition of new structures and the proclamation of the caliphate are intrinsically linked to IS’s terrorist objective of disrupting and destroying the existing secular structures in Syria. IS can thus be classified as an organisation which has as its purpose the commission of terrorist offences, as referred to in Article 140a Sr.

Accused's participation in IS The court finds that the accused participated in the terrorist organisation IS. It is established that the accused travelled with her two minor children of then thirteen and fourteen years old to Syria via Turkey as from 20 October 2014. Whilst the accused had led others to believe that she was going to meet her new husband and get married when on holiday in Turkey, she travelled to the border region between Turkey and Syria. There, together with her children and with the help of third parties, she crossed the border and almost immediately married [name 1], with whom she had been in contact for months via, amongst other things, Facebook, and whom she knew to be an IS fighter.

Before leaving the country, the accused had gathered knowledge about IS, she knew there was a war in Syria and that IS was committing acts of extreme violence against people of other faiths. Even as late as 2023, the accused indicated in an audio message to her sister [sister 2] that she would rather take her children to the war zone in Syria than hand them over to the Dutch authorities, thereby referring to her daughter’s problems in the Netherlands. The court is willing to accept that the accused's journey to the caliphate was partly motivated by a desire to escape the problems she was facing in the Netherlands, however, the decision to subsequently travel to the war zone in Syria and marry an IS fighter, and the preparations for this, constituted a conscious choice on the part of the accused.

By marrying the IS fighter [name 1], the accused chose to settle with her children in the IS caliphate in Syria for an extended period. She shared a household with him, an active IS fighter. The accused and her family lived off the money that [name 1] received from IS. As such, she and her family benefited financially from IS. This support enabled the accused to devote herself to running the household and bringing up the children, which was regarded as an important role for women within IS. [Name 1] possessed a firearm, which was kept in the same house where the accused was staying, and of which she was aware.

Even after her divorce from [name 1] at the end of 2015, the accused remained in Syria until the end of 2018, when the caliphate finally fell. The accused chose to approach the local IS authorities, as evidenced by documents from the IS records obtained, to request an allowance. During that period, she and her children were also registered in the IS records by name and personal identification number.

The accused’s participation in the terrorist organisation IS is further evidenced by the fact that she made both her minor daughter and her minor son available to IS.

After all, she allowed her daughter [minor 2], who was fifteen at the time, to marry an IS fighter within six months of arriving in Syria and, a year later, to marry another IS fighter, and shared a household with both of them. In the court’s view, by acting in this way, she made her daughter available to the ideology of IS, in the sense that, in IS’s view, a woman’s role consists of caring for her husband, running the household, bearing children and raising them in the spirit of jihad, thereby expanding the caliphate and, with it, the organisation IS.

Furthermore, as the court will explain below, the accused did not prevent her son, who was fourteen at the time, from attending two IS camps and subsequently being assigned to a unit of IS, namely the military police, and later to a so-called unit for security and combat, which the court understands to be a combat unit. The accused even wrote to the governor of Raqqa requesting continued payment of the allowance which her son received partly on her behalf from the katiba. By allowing her minor son to be trained in this way and to carry out work for IS, and by benefiting financially from this, the accused supported this organisation in achieving its criminal objective.

In conclusion, through her actions – prompted by her conscious decision to stay in IS territory and by the fact that she made both her children available to IS’s– the accused numerically reinforced IS's sphere of influence. The accused thus carried out conduct that was aimed at or directly related to the realisation of the terrorist intent of IS, while the accused was generally aware of the terrorist intent of this organisation. After all, she was aware of the caliphate and the extreme violence employed by IS, as evidenced by her statement to the police, but also by remarks made to both her sisters both before and after the events.

All the aforementioned facts and circumstances, also viewed in their mutual connection and context, mean that the accused can be regarded as a member of, and (thereby) a participant in the terrorist organisation IS.

Acquittal of co-perpetration

The court is furthermore of the opinion that it cannot be derived from the means of evidence that the foregoing involved close and conscious cooperation between the accused and another person, which at its core consisted of a joint execution, so that the court will acquit the accused of the charges of co-perpetration.

Conclusion count 2

In view of the above, the court finds that, during the period from 1 November 2014 to 1 January 2019, the accused participated in Syria in an organisation which has as its purpose the commission of terrorist offences, namely IS.

In respect of count 3: preparatory acts

Under count 3, the accused is suspected of having committed several punishable preparatory acts, listed in the indictment under the letters A (familiarizing with extremist ideas); B (obtaining information about travelling to the combat zone); C (travelling to Syria); D (joining IS fighters); E (letting her son attend IS training camps and the military policy of IS); and F (possessing firearms).

In assessing this charge, the following legal framework applies.

The acts of preparation and promotion described in Article 96, paragraph two, Sr are punishable regardless of their outcome. The requirement is that the perpetrator undertakes the conduct with the intention of preparing or promoting the terrorist offence in question. Conditional intent to prepare or promote a terrorist offence is not sufficient. The offence being prepared or promoted will have to be established to the extent that it can be determined whether it is an offence for which the preparation and promotion is punishable under Article 96, paragraph two, Sr. Time, place and manner of execution will thus have to be somewhat concrete. The imputed acts of preparation and promotion may be considered together. Even if isolated acts do not constitute punishable preparation, the accused's intent to prepare a crime can be inferred from the combination of all the acts and the accused's ideology together.

Following on from the considerations set out above with respect to the charges under count 3, the court finds as follows.

With regard to the offences charged under A, B, C, D, E and F, the court finds that it can be deduced from the means of evidence that the accused had already familiarised herself with the ideology of IS prior to leaving for Syria by gathering knowledge about it and that she had made a conscious decision in the Netherlands to travel to IS-controlled territory, which she referred to as a war zone. Through the acts that subsequently took place – travelling to Syria and joining IS fighters – she knowingly and willingly sought and obtained affiliation with the IS caliphate, in the course of which, as the court will explain below, she was involved in [minor 1]’s participation in IS training camps and in his assignment to two IS units. Finally, she possessed a firearm whilst living with IS fighter [name 1].

In view of the above and in view of the above findings of fact and considerations with respect to the charges under count 2, the court deems the conduct listed under A, and F to have been legally and convincingly proved, as reflected in the judicial finding of fact.

By so acting, the accused provided herself or others with the opportunity, means and information to commit the terrorist offences mentioned under count 3 and, by having a firearm at her disposal, possessed objects which she knew were intended for the commission of such offences.

Finally, from the combination of these proven acts, considered in combination with each other, the accused's intent to prepare these crimes can be inferred. The defence's argument that there was no terrorist intent is therefore rejected.

Acquittal of co-perpetration In the court’s opinion, there was no close and deliberate collaboration between the accused and another person which essentially consisted of a joint execution so that the accused is acquitted of the charged co-perpetration.

Conclusion on count 3 The court therefore finds that, during the period from May 2014 to 1 January 2019, the accused was guilty of promoting and preparing terrorist offences in the Netherlands, Turkey and Syria.

In respect of count 4: placing and/or keeping a minor in a helpless condition

Under count 4, the accused is suspected of placing and keeping her minor son [minor 1] in a helpless condition by travelling with him to Syria, letting him to stay there for a prolonged period in an area where war was raging, allowing him to join and participate in the terrorist organisation IS, and allowing him to take part in combat and/or violent activities on behalf of IS, or at least failing to prevent this, as a result of which he died in Syria in 2017.

Among other things, the accused travelled from the Netherlands to Syria with her minor son [minor 1] as from 20 October 2014 and stayed in the IS caliphate for a prolonged period. [Minor 1], aged fourteen, attended two IS training camps in IS-controlled territory and worked for the military police. As from April 2017, aged fifteen, he was enlisted into an IS combat unit and was killed on 10 June 2017 during air strikes north of Raqqa. Through her actions and by failing to prevent [minor 1] from being enlisted by IS, the accused deliberately accepted the significant risk that his life or health would be endangered and, in doing so, placed him in a helpless situation and left him there, for which he ultimately paid with his life.

The fact that the accused, by her own account, wished to live in a peaceful area does not alter this. She was aware of the war situation in Syria before travelling there with [minor 1].

The fact that a parent and the child were unable to leave the combat zone may play a role in the question of whether there was a case of deliberately keeping the minor child in a helpless condition. However, the case file does provide insufficient basis that the accused wanted to leave IS territory.

Conclusion count 4 The court therefore finds that the charge set out in count 4 has been legally and convincingly proved insofar as it concerns the period from 20 October 2014 up to 10 June 2017, the day that [minor 1] died.

In respect of count 5: removal from parental custody

The accused is charged of, by deception, removing her minor children from their father’s parental custody by travelling to Syria, and of having kept them removed from his custody by remaining there with the children and failing to bring them back to the Netherlands.

The accused married [the father] on [date] 1999. During this marriage, [minor 2] and [minor 1] were born. Even after the marriage ended, [the father] and the accused both retained parental custody over the children.

In September 2014, the accused asked [the father] for permission to go on holiday to Turkey with the children as from 20 October 2014, during the autumn break. On 18 October 2014, [the father] granted that permission on the basis of that account of the situation.

Contrary to what she had led him to believe, the accused travelled on from Turkey to Syria with the children, with no intention of returning to the Netherlands. She had, after all, cleared out her home and terminated the tenancy without [the father] or her own family knowing. By acting in this way, the accused used deceit to remove the children from, and keep them removed from, the parental custody of [the father].

The defence has argued that the protected legal interest in the offence of removal from lawful authority – namely, the protection of the minor – has not been infringed, as [the father], as the father, played no actual role in the care and upbringing of his children. Leaving aside the fact that the case file does contain evidence suggesting that [the father] had some involvement in the children’s welfare, it is established that the accused did, in fact, recognise [the father] as the father with parental authority – and acted accordingly – especially when requesting permission for the holiday abroad. The court considers that this defence – which the court regards as a defence to the charge and not, as argued by the defence counsel, as a matter affecting the criminal liability for the offence – must be rejected for that reason alone.

Conclusion count 5 It has thus been legally and convincingly proved that, during the period from 20 October 2014 to 21 February 2018, the accused used deceit to remove and keep the children removed from the parental custody of [the father].

In respect of count 1: conscription and enlistment of child soldiers

In brief, the accused is charged with being guilty of complicity in and/or with the conscription and enlistment by others of her son [minor 1], aged under the age of fifteen, in hostilities during the period from 1 October 2015 up to and including 16 August 2016.

4.3.8.1. Legal framework for the conscription and enlistment of child soldiers

The charge is based on Article 6(3)(f) of the ICA, which criminalises the conscription or enlistment of children under the age of fifteen into the national armed forces or armed groups, or their use for active participation in hostilities, in the context of a non-international armed conflict.

Article 6(3)(f) of the ICA reflects Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: ICC). That article classifies the conscription or enlistment of children under the age of fifteen into national armed forces or armed groups, military service, or their use for active participation in hostilities as a war crime. In interpreting Article 6(3)(f) of the ICA, the court took into account the Elements of Crimes, which, pursuant to the aforementioned Statute, are intended to assist in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute. The Elements of Crimes relating to Article 8(2)(e)(vii) read as follows:

Article 8(2)(e)(vii)

War crime of using, conscripting and enlisting children

Elements

1. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into an armed force or group or used one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities.

2. Such person or persons were under the age of 15 years.

3. The perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or persons were under the age of 15 years.

4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.

5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

The court has also taken into account rulings by international criminal tribunals and the ICC, which provide further guidance on the interpretation and application of the conscription and enlistment of child soldiers, as set out in more detail below. 4

Non-international armed conflict and organised armed groups

Article 6(3)(f) of the ICA makes violations of international humanitarian law committed in a non-international armed conflict a criminal offence.

According to established case law of the ICC, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter: ICTY) and the Court of Appeal in The Hague, a non-international armed conflict exists if there is persistent armed violence between the government and one or more organised armed groups, or between such armed groups themselves, with a sufficient degree of intensity.5

In determining whether IS can be classified as an “organised armed group” within the meaning of Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute, the court also takes into account established case law of the ICC and the Court of Appeal in The Hague, which sets out requirements regarding the level of organisation of the armed group.6

Conscription and enlisting of child soldiers

As described above, Article 6(3)(f) of the ICA criminalises the conscription or enlistment of children under the age of fifteen into the national armed forces or armed groups, or their use for active participation in hostilities.

This is a translation of the legal text from the Rome Statute, where the terms “conscription”, “enlistment” and “using to participate actively in hostilities” are used. “Conscription” refers to calling up children to the national armed forces or armed groups, whilst “enlistment” refers to taking them into military service.

It follows from case law that ‘conscripting’ refers to forced recruitment, whilst ‘enlisting’ refers to non-forced recruitment.7 For the sake of clarity in this judgment, the court translates the terms “conscripting” and “enlisting” into Dutch as ‘recruitment’ (whether forced or not). The court uses the term “using to participate actively in hostilities” where the reference is to “using to participate actively in hostilities”.

The Elements of Crimes refer to recruitment, whether forced or not, into an armed force or group. This concerns national armed forces or armed groups, and “recruitment”, whether forced or not, refers to a child under the age of fifteen joining these national armed forces or armed groups. Forced recruitment (conscription) can be established by demonstrating that a person has joined the armed forces or an armed group as a result of, amongst other things, a legal obligation, brutal force, the threat of force or psychological pressure amounting to coercion. Non-forced recruitment (enlistment) is understood to mean: voluntary enlistment or registration on the list of a military authority or armed group.

Recruitment (whether forced or not) is a continuing offence. This means that the offence is committed from the moment the child is recruited (whether forced or not) and continues for as long as the child is part of or associated with the national armed forces or an armed group, or until the child reaches the age of fifteen. It is not a requirement here that the recruitment (whether forced or not) leads to active participation in hostilities. After all, the criminalisation relates to three distinct criminal acts.8

The use of a child for active participation in hostilities is, in view of the wording of the charge, not at issue in the present case and will therefore not be discussed further.

Age

Case law establishes that determining whether the child is a person under the age of fifteen is a factual determination. Furthermore, it follows from the Elements of Crimes that the perpetrator knew or ought to have known that the child was under the age of fifteen. The perpetrator(s) therefore have an active duty to investigate and (further) establish the child’s age.

Nexus

The nexus requirement is intended to safeguard the scope of application of international humanitarian law and to ensure that this law is not applied to acts or ordinary offences that have no connection whatsoever with the armed conflict. 9 The conflict must have played a substantial role in the opportunity or decision to commit the offence, the manner in which the offence was committed, or the purpose for which it was committed.10 The perpetrator must have been aware of the factual circumstances that led to the armed conflict.11

4.3.8.2. Legal framework complicity

Complicity within the meaning of Article 48 Sr is established where a suspect has intentionally assisted in the commission of an offence or has intentionally provided the opportunity, means or information necessary for the commission of an offence.

For complicity in a crime to be proven, it must be proven not only that the accused's intent was directed towards her actions as an accomplice within the meaning of Article 48, preamble and paragraphs 1 or 2 Sr, but also that her intent, whether or not in conditional form, was directed towards the criminal offence committed by the perpetrator (the principal offence).

A person who intentionally fails to prevent the offence from being committed may also be guilty of complicity, but this can only be the case if the accused had a legal duty to intervene. In that case, this constitutes what is known as passive complicity.12

The court assesses whether the accused had a legal duty to intervene on the basis of the following:

- the existence of a legal duty to intervene may arise from standards generally accepted in society. An explicit statutory provision from which the legal duty arises is not a requirement;

- special circumstances may lead to a situation where a person may be expected to intervene to prevent a criminal offence, or that they are, on the contrary, under no obligation to do so.13

4.3.8.3. Assessment of the court

Non-international armed conflict in Syria?

Previous judgments have already established that, from 1 January 2012 onwards – and therefore also during the period covered by the charges – there was a non-international armed conflict in Syria between the Syrian government army and various organised armed groups, including the armed group ISIL/ISIS/IS. The court will, for the purposes of establishing the existence of the non-international armed conflict as such, confine itself to referring to those earlier judgments.14

Organised armed group

The court finds that it follows from previous case law that ISIL/ISIS/IS can be classified as an armed group, and that the requirement of sufficient organisation is also met.15 The Court of Appeal in The Hague ruled that, in 2014 and 2015, IS had military weapons and vehicles such as tanks and artillery at its disposal. Furthermore, IS was capable of carrying out large-scale military operations. IS also had a command structure and exercised control over a territory at least until March 2019. In addition, there were various alliances with other groups.16 On the basis of the foregoing, the court concludes that IS as a whole can be regarded as an armed group.

The recruitment of [minor 1]

The court must determine whether it can be proved legally and convincingly that the accused is guilty of complicity in the recruitment by IS of [minor 1], a child under the age of fifteen.

Arguments of the defence

The defence has argued that, in view of the information contained in the case file, it cannot be established that [minor 1] was a member of the military police. At most, it can be established that [minor 1] was a member of the regular police and that he attended a Sharia camp. The defence further argued that, even if [Minor 1] were to have been working for the military police, the military police were not part of the armed group IS, but formed part of the civilian infrastructure. Furthermore, the defence argued that [minor 1], whilst admitted to IS, did not contribute to or was not deployed for the hostilities.

Assessment of the principal offence

It is apparent from the facts and circumstances established above that [minor 1] , then aged fourteen, attended an IS Sharia camp (religious training camp) and an IS askari camp (military training camp) around October 2015. Attending these training camps formed part of IS’s recruitment of new fighters. Contrary to the defence’s argument, the court concludes that this also applied to children under the age of fifteen. [Minor 1] was fourteen years old whilst participating in both IS camps. Subsequently, from 18 January 2016, [Minor 1] was assigned to the IS military police until well after he had turned fifteen. At the start of that period, he received a firearm from IS and received a monthly allowance in connection with his work.

The defence argues that [minor 1] was employed by a civilian branch of the police and was therefore not working for IS as a combat group. The court, however, is of the opinion that IS must be regarded as a single large, highly organised, armed group and that there was no civilian branch of the police that was separate from the armed group at the time. All police units formed part of the armed group IS.

Recruitment takes place when a child is admitted into an armed group, regardless of which unit of that armed group they join. It is not a requirement for recruitment that the child actively contributes to the hostilities.

After all, participation in hostilities – which, as mentioned, is not at issue in this criminal case – is a separate criminal offence. Once recruited, [minor 1], after completing the two IS training camps, was assigned to the military police, which forms part of IS. Contrary to the defence’s view, the court is of the opinion that this constitutes continued recruitment of [minor 1] by the armed group IS.

The IS members who recruited [minor 1] had an active duty to investigate the age of [minor 1]. The evidence shows that [minor 1] possessed a passport in Syria. According to the IS records, dates of birth were registered. In the IS records, [minor 1]’s date of birth is recorded as [date of birth 4] 2001, whilst his actual date of birth is [date of birth 2] -2001. By recording the date of birth solely on the basis of the year of birth, the IS members failed to fulfil their active duty to investigate.

The court is of the opinion that there was sufficient connection with the armed conflict and that the nexus requirement has been met, since it has been established that [minor 1] was recruited (taken into military service) by one of the warring parties in the armed conflict, namely the armed group IS. This group, as the court established above, formed part of the non-international armed conflict in Syria.

It is established that [minor 1] was recruited by IS at the age of fourteen. As it does not appear from the case file that the recruitment of [minor 1] by IS took place under coercion, the court finds that this constituted non-coercive recruitment by one or more members of the Islamic State.

Assessment of the accused's complicity As the mother of the minor [minor 1], the accused had a legal duty, pursuant to, amongst other things, Article 1:247 of the Dutch Civil Code (hereinafter: BW), to care for her minor child as a parent. This includes the child’s mental and physical well-being and safety. As the accused had a legal duty towards her son, there may be a case of passive complicity in the present instance.

On 20 October 2014, the accused travelled to IS-controlled territory with her then thirteen-year-old son [minor 1]. The accused was aware of the fact that she was taking her minor child to a war zone. In this war zone, minor boys were regarded as the future fighters of the jihad. News reports on the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers by IS had already been published before the accused left the country. As a fourteen-year-old in Syria, [minor 1] attended two training camps organised by IS. The accused did not prevent [minor 1] from attending these camps. Whilst the defence has argued that at some point the accused [minor 1] from the training camp or had him collected, the court notes that there is no evidence of this in the case file. In fact, following the training camps, [minor 1] was assigned to the IS military police from January 2016 onwards, for which he received an allowance which partly went to the accused, a situation which the accused allowed to continue.

It is due to her own actions that the accused created a situation in which it became possible for her minor son [minor 1] to be recruited by IS, which is what happened. She thus consciously accepted the significant chance that [minor 1] would be recruited by IS at the age of fourteen.

Through her actions and her failure to act, the accused was an accomplice to the non-coercive recruitment of her minor son [minor 1] by IS, the court rules, given that she took [minor 1] to IS territory, failed to prevent him from attending two IS camps, and failed to prevent him from carrying out duties with the IS military police. The recruitment of [minor 1] by IS constitutes a continuing offence and therefore continued until his fifteenth birthday.

Conclusion count 1 The court therefore finds that the offence charged under count 1 has been legally and convincingly proved in so far as it relates to the period from 1 October 2015 up to and including 16 August 2016.

Judicial finding of fact

With regard to the offences charged under 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, the court finds that these offences have been proved legally and convincingly. The court declares proved against the accused that:

1

one or more members of Islamic State,

in the period from 1 October 2015 to 16 August 2016 in Syria,

jointly and in association with others in connection with a non-international armed conflict on the territory of Syria

conscripted a child under the age of fifteen, namely [minor 1], into the national armed forces or conscripted him into military service, by

– having [minor 1] attend a Sharia camp and/or an Askari camp, and

– to conscript him in and have him carry out work for the military police of Islamic State (al-shurta al-‘askariyya),

for the commission of which offence the accused, during the period from 1 September 2014 up to and including 16 August 2016, in the Netherlands, Turkey and Syria, intentionally provided opportunities, by

– transporting her son [minor 1] to the area in Syria that was under the control of Islamic State (IS territory) and

–failing to prevent her son [minor 1] from attending the aforementioned Sharia and Askari camps, and being conscripted in the military police of Islamic State (al-shurta al-‘askariyya), whilst she, the accused, was aware of the existence of the non-international armed conflict on the territory of Syria.

2

she, in the period from 1 November 2014 to 1 January 2019 in Syria,

participated in a terrorist organisation, namely Islamic State (IS), which organisation had the objective of committing terrorist crimes, namely,

A. deliberately setting fire and/or causing an explosion, while there is a general risk of danger to property and/or danger of grievous bodily harm and/or danger to life for another person and/or this offence results in someone's death (as referred to in Article 157 of the Dutch Penal Code), (to be) committed with terrorist intent and/or

B. manslaughter (to be) committed with terrorist intent (as referred to in Article 288a of the Dutch Penal Code) and/or

C. murder (to be) committed with terrorist intent (as referred to in Article 289/289a in conjunction with Article 83 of the Dutch Penal Code) and/or

D. the conspiracy and/or deliberate preparation and/or promotion of previously mentioned serious offences (as referred to in Articles 176a and/or 289a and/or 96(2) of the Dutch Penal Code) and/or

E. possession of one or more category II and/or III weapons and/or ammunition (as referred to in Article 26(1) of the Weapons and Ammunition Act) (to be) committed with terrorist intent and/or with the intent to prepare or facilitate a terrorist offence (as referred to in Article 55(1) and/or (5) of the Weapons and Ammunition Act).

3

she in the period from May 2014 to 1 January 2019, in the Netherlands, Turkey and Syria, with the intention of preparing and/or facilitating the offences to be committed:

- deliberately setting fire and/or causing an explosion, while there is a general risk of danger to property and/or danger of grievous bodily harm and/or danger to life for another person and/or this offence results in someone's death, (to be) committed with terrorist intent (as referred to in Article 157 in conjunction with in Article 176a of the Dutch Penal Code) and/or

- manslaughter (to be) committed with terrorist intent (as referred to in Article 288a of the Dutch Penal Code) and/or

- murder (to be) committed with terrorist intent (as referred to in Article 289 in conjunction with Article 83 of the Dutch Penal Code)

- sought to provide herself or others the opportunity, means and/or information for the commission of the serious offence, and/or

- possessed one or more objects of which she, the accused, knew that they were intended for the commission of the serious offence, since she, the accused, has

adopted the radical extremist ideology of the armed Jihad struggle with terrorist intent, conducted by terrorist organisation Islamic State;

obtained information about travelling to and staying in the combat zone in Syria;

made the journey to Syria in order to travel to the combat zone, or at least to an area controlled by the terrorist organisation IS;

entered into a marriage in accordance with Islamic law with IS member [name 1] and maintained a joint household with IS members [name 1], [name 2], [minor 1] and/or [name 3];

assisted her son [minor 1], born on [date of birth 2] 2001, and enabled him to take part in IS training camps and the IS military police and an IS combat unit, and

possessed a firearm, namely a Kalashnikov belonging to [name 1];

4

she, during the period from 20 October 2014 up to and including 10 June 2017 in the Netherlands, Turkey and Syria deliberately placed or kept in a helpless condition

her minor child named [minor 1], born on [date of birth 2] 2001, for whose maintenance, nursing and care she was legally obliged as the mother of [minor 1],

by travelling with [minor 1] to Syria and taking him to, and allowing him to remain for a prolonged period in, an area where armed conflicts were taking place and/or acts of war were being committed and allowing [minor 1] to join and participate in the terrorist organisation IS and to have him take part in combat and/or violent activities on behalf of IS, or at least failing to prevent the aforementioned acts by [minor 1],

as a result of which [minor 1] died in Syria in 2017;

5

she in or around the period from 20 October 2014 up to and including 21 February 2018 in the Netherlands, Turkey and Syria, intentionally removed her minor children [minor 2], (born on [date of birth 3] 2000) and [minor 1] (born on [date of birth 2] 2001) and/or kept them removed from the father’s custody over those minors, [the father],

since the accused took the children from the Netherlands via Turkey to Syria and kept them there, failing to return them to the Netherlands, having used deception by pretending to [the father] that she was taking the children on holiday to Turkey.

To the extent that the indictment contains typographical and linguistic errors, these have been corrected and italicised in the finding of facts, without the accused's defence being prejudiced.

5. The punishability of the proven facts

The proven facts are punishable by law, as no facts or circumstances have been demonstrated which exclude the punishability of the facts.

6. The punishability of the accused

The accused is also punishable as no facts or circumstances have been demonstrated which exclude her punishability.

7. The imposition of punishment

The demand of the public prosecutor

The public prosecutor demanded that the accused be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven years, less time spent in pre-trial detention.

The point of view of the defence

The defence requested the court, when determining the sentence, to take into account the fact that the accused travelled to Syria to escape her problems in the Netherlands, not so muchbecause she supported the jihadist cause. In Syria, the accused became a victim of severe domestic violence and spent five years in appalling conditions in Kurdish camps. The defence has also argued that the reasonable time limit has been exceeded in the present case, which should lead to a reduced sentence. The defence has requested that, should the accused be found guilty, part of the sentence be imposed as a conditional sentence, subject to the specific conditions recommended by the probation service.

The opinion of the court

The sentence referred to below is in accordance with the gravity of the offences committed, the circumstances under which they were committed and is based on the person and personal circumstances of the accused, as demonstrated during the hearing. The court takes the following into account in particular.

Gravity of the offences

The accused travelled out to Syria in October 2014, together with her two minor children, [minor 2] of fourteen years old and [minor 1] of thirteen years old. At the time, the accused knew of the of IS' views and actions. Once in Syria, the accused married an IS fighter after a few days with whom she shared a household. She embraced the extremist ideology of IS and remained in IS-controlled areas for years, right up until the end, when the caliphate fell, thereby strengthening IS’s power through her presence. Furthermore, through her actions, she placed both her minor daughter and her minor son at the disposal of IS. She allowed her daughter to marry an IS fighter twice at a young age. In addition, she failed to prevent her son, who was under the age of fifteen, from attending two IS camps, including a military training camp, and she failed to prevent her son, who was fourteen at the time, from carrying out duties for the IS military police. Not only did the accused fail to prevent this, but she also benefited financially from it.

During her marriage, she facilitated her husband’s work for IS as an IS fighter by running the joint household and looking after him. After her marriage, she facilitated her son’s work for IS in the same way. In doing so, she promoted the commission of terrorist offences.

Militant groups such as IS aim to establish a caliphate in which the rights of dissenters are violated in a systematic and highly violently manner. It has been established that the violence used by IS to achieve its goal was exceptionally brutal and that serious crimes such as summary executions, murder, torture, enslavement and mutilation of prisoners of war and civilians were committed against dissenters on a large scale. Furthermore, IS was jointly responsible for the destruction or wrecking of houses, agriculture and infrastructure. Terrorised residents fled and had to leave everything behind as a result. There have also been countless attacks in the name of IS, not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in Europe and the rest of the world. All this has led to widespread feelings of fear and insecurity from 2014 onwards. This is also IS's ulterior goal: sowing fear and division among what they consider to be an infidel part of the world's population.

The accused completely ignored all this when she joined IS and did not want to acknowledge the indescribable suffering that has affected many in the battle zone and beyond. The court holds this against the accused severely.

Not only has the accused committed offences relating to terrorism, but she has also been an accomplice to a war crime. War crimes are serious offences, as they constitute very grave violations of international humanitarian law. The war crime to which the accused was an accomplice concerns the recruitment of her son [minor 1] – who was under the age of fifteen at the time – into the armed group IS. The court also regards this as a very serious offence on the part of the accused. The prohibition on the conscription and enlistment of child soldiers is a rule considered fundamental to the international legal order. When children become involved in armed groups, they are placed in grave danger. Children recruited into armed forces or armed groups face an increased risk of being exposed to highly reprehensible ideologies and an environment rife with violence, and of being captured, injured or even killed. And it is precisely children who are entitled to special protection under international humanitarian law.

Prior to her departure, the accused knew that an armed conflict was taking place in Syria at that time, but she went anyway. Her conscious decision to do so has had irreversible consequences for the accused and her children. Her minor children have had to spend part of their lives in a war zone and in IS-controlled areas, with all the dangers and risks that entails. Although this was never the accused's intention, [minor 1] paid for it with his life.

Criminal record

The court took note of the accused's criminal record dated 5 August 2024, which shows that the accused has not been previously convicted of similar offences.

The personality of the accused

With regard to the personality and personal circumstances of the accused, the court took note of the contents of the Pro Justitia report dated 4 August 2025, the ideological interpretation report prepared by Nuance door Training en Advies (NTA) dated 2 June 2025 and the probation report dated 16 March 2026.

Responsibility In the Pro Justitia report, the expert concludes that the accused does not currently suffer from a mental disorder, an intellectual disability or a psychogeriatric condition. However, the accused does exhibit symptoms of depression and has experienced many traumatic events in her life, which she does not yet appear to have fully come to terms with and which she is currently suppressing as much as possible in order to cope with life in detention. Nor does there appear to have been any mental disorder, intellectual disability or psychogeriatric condition at the time of the charged offences. In view of this, the expert recommends that the offences charged be attributed in full to the accused.

Risk of recidivism

The interpretation report concludes that, at present, the accused does not hold any political or politico-religious attitudes that could be classified as an ideological conviction. Specifically, the accused currently holds no extremist views regarding the democratic legal order, jihad, martyrdom, hijra or the concept of the caliphate. The accused generally has a very basic understanding of Islam due to a lack of any formal education or training. Nor does she appear to have delved further into politico-religious issues in recent years.

In the Pro Justitia report, the expert assesses the risk of general reoffending as low, given the few risk factors and a number of protective factors, such as a prosocial support network, a sufficiently developed conscience and self-control. The risk of extremist violence is also assessed as low.

The risk of recidivism was also investigated by Reclassering Nederland. The Probation Service assesses the risk of extremist violence as low, given that the accused firmly rejects violence and does not hold any political or politico-religious attitudes that could be classified as extremist beliefs. There are also several protective factors, and the accused has expressed remorse regarding her choices.

Conclusion In the court’s opinion, the reports drawn up by the aforementioned experts were prepared with due care, and their conclusions are supported by sound and clearly reasoned grounds. The court therefore adopts these conclusions and endorses them.

Type and severity of the sentence

In determining the type and severity of the sentence, the court sought to follow the sentences that are usually imposed in somewhat similar cases. The court points out in this respect that no suspect has been convicted of complicity in the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers in the Netherlands before and that this criminal offence carries considerable weight in the sentencing process.

In determining the sentence in this case, the court, mindful of the above, takes into account the following sentencing mitigating circumstances.

In a mitigating sense, the court weighs that following the fall of the caliphate, the accused spent a long period of time in the Al Hol and Al Roj detention camps under appalling conditions, and has thus already suffered significant negative consequences as a result of her actions.

The court also takes into account, as does the public prosecutor, as a mitigating factor that the accused did not travel to Syria with the aim of having [minor 1] recruited as a child soldier.

Reasonable term

The court considers that Article 6(1) of the ECHR guarantees the right of every suspect to be tried within a reasonable time. The basic principle in cases of preventively detained suspects is that the hearing must be completed with a final judgment within 16 months after the reasonable term started, unless there are special circumstances. The accused was arrested by the police on 7 May 2024. The court will deliver judgment today on 5 June 2026, after more than 24 months.

The present case relates to criminal offences that did not take place on Dutch territory. The case file therefore includes a number statements of witnesses residing abroad who have been heard. In view of the above, the scope and complexity of the investigation, the nature of the allegations, and the expeditious manner in which the case has been investigated and dealt with, the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which mean that the reasonable time limit has not been exceeded.

Conclusion

In the court's opinion, all things considered, the only appropriate response is to impose an unconditional prison sentence.

The court considers that an entirely unconditional prison sentence of seven years is appropriate and warranted. The time the accused spent in pre-trial detention will be deducted from this.

8. The injured party's claim

The position of the public prosecutor

The public prosecutor concluded that the injured party’s claim should be granted. In support of this, the public prosecutor argued that the claim is clearly substantiated and that the amount of damages claimed is reasonable.

The position of the defence

On behalf of the injured party, the defence primarily argued that the injured party’s claim should be declared inadmissible, as the defence had sought a (partial) acquittal. Subsidiary, the defence argued that the injured party’s claim should be dismissed as there was no concrete evidence to substantiate that there was harm “in other respects”. More subsidiary, the defence argued that the injured party’s claim should be declared inadmissible because the hearing of the claim would place a disproportionate burden on the criminal proceedings.

The opinion of the court

Dutch law applies Claims of injured parties are governed by substantive civil law. This also means that, pursuant to Article 10:2 BW, the court ex officio applies the rules of private international law and the law designated by those rules. In this case, the assessment of the claims should be made according to Dutch law. This follows from the so-called Rome II regulation. Indeed, the claims are non-contractual claims within the meaning of Article 1 of the Rome II Regulation. Under Article 3, this regulation has a universal formal scope of application. This means that this regulation applies to cases brought before Dutch courts, even if the law of a non-member state is designated by the application of the rules of the Rome II regulation. Finally, the Rome II Regulation applies to damage-causing events that occurred from 11 January 2009 onwards. Under Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation, when assessing an alleged wrongful act, the law of the country where the damage occurs applies. This leads to the conclusion that Dutch law applies when assessing the claim of the injured party. After all, the (alleged) damage-causing events on which the injured party based his claim occurred in the Netherlands. The applicability of Dutch law was not in dispute during the hearing.

Article 6:106 BW

The court considers that Article 6:106 BW provides an exhaustive list of cases in which this provision entitles the injured party to compensation for immaterial damage. According to Article 6:106, preamble, under (b) BW, the injured party is entitled to compensation, to be determined in conformity with the standards of reasonableness and fairness, for harm that does not consist of material loss, if the injured party sustained physical injuries or if his honour or reputation is injured or if he is harmed otherwise in person. The question before us is whether the injured party has been harmed “otherwise”.

In its clarification ruling of 28 May 2019, the Supreme Court considered the following with regard to harm to a person “otherwise”:

“The harm to a person ‘otherwise’ as referred to in subparagraph (b) is in any event present if the injured party has suffered psychological injury. A person invoking this must provide sufficiently concrete evidence from which it can be inferred that psychological injury has arisen in connection with the circumstances of the case. To this end, it is required that the existence of psychological injury can be established according to objective criteria. Even if the existence of psychological injury in the aforementioned sense cannot be assumed, it cannot be ruled out that the nature and severity of the violation of standards and its consequences for the injured party may entail that the harm to the person referred to in Article 6:106, preamble and under b BW has occurred 'otherwise'. In such a case, the person invoking this provision will have to substantiate the harm of their person with specific evidence. This is only otherwise the case if the nature and severity of the violation of standards mean that the relevant adverse consequences for the injured party are so obvious that harm to their person can be presumed. Harm of a person otherwise as referred to in Article 6:106, preamble and subparagraph (b) DCC does not arise merely from the violation of a fundamental right.”

On this basis, the court finds that the mere violation of the right to “family life” under Article 8 of the ECHR is insufficient to constitute harm to a person “otherwise”. In view of the case file and the proceedings at the hearing, the court further finds that the nature and seriousness of the violation of standards and its consequences in the present case are not so evident as to allow for the conclusion that such harm, as alleged, has occurred. Whilst there is indeed a formal relationship of authority, it has remained unclear to what extent the injured party was actually involved in the family life of [minor 1] and [minor 2]. The injured party may therefore be expected to substantiate, on the basis of specific evidence, that there has been harm of the person “otherwise”; such substantiation is currently lacking. Allowing the injured party the opportunity to further substantiate their claim would place a disproportionate burden on the criminal proceedings, also in view of the fact that the reasonable time limit has been exceeded. The court will therefore determine that the injured party’s claim is inadmissible. The injured party may, however, still bring their claim before the civil court.

As the injured party’s claim is to be declared inadmissible, the court will compensate for the costs incurred in connection with this claim by ordering the accused and the injured party each to bear their own costs.

9. The applicable sections of the law

- 48, 49, 57, 83, 83 a, 96, 140a, 157, 176a, 176b, 255, 257, 279, 288, 288a, 289 and 289a of the Dutch Penal Code;

- 6 of the International Crimes Act.

These regulations have been applied as they were applicable in law at the time of the proven offence or are applicable in law at the time of this judgment.

10. The decision

9 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber Decision, 2 October 1995, para.70.

10 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 12 June 2022, para. 57 and 58. See also Court of Appeal The Hague, 14 November 2023, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2023:2191, para. 10.1.3.

11. ICC, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Judgment, 8 July 2019, para. 733.

12. Cf. Supreme Court, 27 November 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AD4434.

13. Cf. Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 28 February 2025, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2025:1156.

14. Cf. Court of Appeal The Hague, 14 November 2023, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2023:2191; Court of Appeal The Hague, 6 December 2022, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2022:2421; Court of Appeal The Hague, 26 January 2021, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2021:103.

15. Cf. Court of Appeal The Hague, 26 January 2021, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2021:103.

16. District Court The Hague, 29 June 2021, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:6620.